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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                             New York, N.Y.
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                                             19 Cr. 833 (SHS)
                V.
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     CAMERON BREWSTER and JENNIFER
     SHAH,
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                    Defendants.
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      ----X
                                              Argument
 8
                                              July 23, 2021
9
                                              10:40 a.m.
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     Before:
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                          HON. SIDNEY H. STEIN,
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                                              District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
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          Southern District of New York
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THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel and the visitors, spectators, everyone is reminded that, whether you are present in the courthouse or listening to this proceeding from elsewhere, the recording or rebroadcasting of it in any manner is prohibited by law.

Counsel, please state your names for the record.

MR. SOBELMAN: Robert Sobelman, Kiersten Fletcher, and Sheb Swett for the United States. Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. SWETT: Good morning.

THE COURT: You may be seated in the back.

MR. POSCABLO: Ryan Poscablo, on behalf of Cameron Brewster, your Honor. Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. ALONSO: Good morning, your Honor. Daniel Alonso, Henry Asbill, and Priya Chaudhry on behalf of Jennifer Shah.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Good morning.

MR. ASBILL: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: And are any of your clients here,

gentlemen?

MR. ALONSO: Yes. Ms. Shah is sitting next to me, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHAH: Good morning.

MR. POSCABLO: Mr. Brewster is on the line, your

Honor, pursuant to your Honor's order.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning to him.

All right. We have two motions. I will call them the

Brewster motion and the Shah motion. I would like to handle

the Shah motion first, and I will hear from the movant.

Let's handle the Shah motion. Go item by item. I may

ask questions, but in any event I will let the government

respond. I think that's the way to get some order here.

MR. ALONSO: Thank you, your Honor. If I may proceed.

THE COURT: Mr. Alonso, you will be dealing, all right, with the motion.

Let's first handle the motion -- you will tell me if you are withdrawing some of these issues, so that there is no need to deal with them, to the extent the motion seeks a dismissal of the superseding indictment. Go ahead. Speak to that.

MR. ALONSO: So I will speak to that.

I just want to telegraph for the Court that I think that four of our motions are actually quite intertwined, so I may refer to some of them while I am talking about others.

So I think the motion for dismissal obviously is paramount --

THE COURT: You are talking about subsections of your motion.

MR. ALONSO: No. I actually am saying that there are themes that run through the motion to dismiss, the bill of particulars, the motion for inspection of the grand jury minutes, and the motion for *Brady* material. It all is related to the fundamental question of what exactly the government is charging here.

That's obviously very important in terms of the dismissal of the indictment. It's crucial in terms of notice. They simply haven't alleged appropriately the requisite intent to harm the victims on the part of Ms. Shah in this indictment. What the government has tried to do, as I think we pointed out in quite some detail in both our opening memorandum and our reply brief, but what the government has tried to do is simply rest on, you know, cases that say that they do little more than allege the elements of the crime and the time and place. But the reality is, they have to do more. And there are a number of cases —

THE COURT: Well, what they have to do is, they have to state the elements of the offense, they have to inform the defendant what she is charged with so that she can defend.

That's pretty straightforward, sir.

MR. ALONSO: It is straightforward.

THE COURT: It's not a high burden. It's an important burden, but it's not a high burden. You have to know what you are being charged with, and you have to know it in such a way

that you can defend against it. You don't have to know each and every aspect of it. She doesn't have to know, from the standpoint of the request to dismiss, each material misrepresentation. She doesn't have to know each of her contact — I'm sorry, the government doesn't have to set forth in the indictment the list of the victims or the representations, the false — allegedly false representations made to each victim. That is for other issues. We are talking about the dismissal of the superseding indictment. The burden isn't — again, it is important, but I would characterize it under the case law as not very high.

Would you accept that?

MR. ALONSO: I would accept that the case law says what your Honor says, and I would also submit to your Honor that the Second Circuit has either upheld or dismissed a number of indictments under the standard that I am urging.

When they are setting forth a general -- a general statute, like wire fraud and conspiracy, which are so incredibly broad, they have to, in the words of the Supreme Court in Russell, descend to particulars. I'm not saying they have to set out all the things that your Honor just said. Clearly that's correct. You don't have to set forth a bill of particulars inside an indictment, nor have we asked for them to lay out a road map to their evidence. What we are simply pointing out is a fundamental defect in the indictment in that

wire fraud requires a specific intent to harm, and here that has not been alleged. What -- other than the boilerplate elements of the indictment -- of the statutes have been alleged, but they are not saying --

THE COURT: In other words, you do agree, as you have to, that they do charge intent.

MR. ALONSO: Only when they are tracking the language of 18 United States Code 1349 and 1343, right? There --

THE COURT: At no point -- I am quoting from paragraph four. "At no point did the defendants intend that the victims would actually earn any of the promised return on their intended investment nor did the victims actually earn any such returns."

MR. ALONSO: Correct. Those words are there, and I will point your Honor to two things. One is, the government's responses here mischaracterizes what that says. That does not say what it should say. If they are going to allege a false promise fraud case, like this one, they need to say, based on ample case law going back over a hundred years, they need to say, at the time of the promises made, they had no intention specifically of performing.

That's not what they say here. They are saying here — the government mischaracterizes this in their response. They are saying here that at no point did they form the intent that good things would happen. They are not saying in this

indictment that they formed the intent that bad things would happen. The requirement is they have to intend to harm the victims or the purchasers here. What they are saying is at no point did they form the intent for them to make money.

That's not the same thing, your Honor. It really isn't. And I think the reason it is so intertwined, and I bring up these other things, it's intertwined because I'm not sure they can allege this. Right? That's why the Brady motion and the grand jury motion are so important. Because of the material that we have uncovered that the government, you know, claims they didn't have until the day of this indictment. Not true. They have had it for years. The fact is that, at the time that these promises were being made, as far as we can tell, from the millions of documents that they have given us, they are — the purchasers were being in fact told, it was being disclaimed that any promises were being made.

So I think that careful wording it's very cute but it does not follow --

THE COURT: Wait just a moment. Go ahead. Go ahead.

MR. ALONSO: I'm saying I think that the careful wording in the indictment, it is -- sorry, I have it over there, it is the paragraph where you said at no point did they intend, that careful wording is, I think, because they are unable to allege what they really need to allege, which is that the defendants specifically intended, right -- Ms. Shah,

selling leads, you know, brokering leads to -- ultimately to sales floors intended that those people would not make money from this, when the government knows -- it has in their files -- that they are being told exactly the opposite, that nobody is promising you any particular return. So that language --

THE COURT: But isn't that a jury issue as to what they were told and what they weren't told?

MR. ALONSO: Of course. Of course. What they were told and what they weren't told is a jury issue, but the allegation has to be -- it has to be, your Honor -- that Ms. Shah intended to harm each and every one of these people whose leads she sold. And it seems --

THE COURT: Wait. The indictment has to say that she intended to harm each and every person? No. You don't mean that.

MR. ALONSO: Each and every person is a bit of hyperbole. I apologize. She -- it has to allege -- THE COURT: The intent had to be there to harm somebody.

MR. ALONSO: To harm them. Exactly. And given that their theory is that they are being promised somehow -- I don't know how you are promised returns on tax preparation services, but be that as it may, the theory appears to be that they are being promised, at the time of these sales, that they are

going to make some specific monetary return. That appears to be the theory. It's vague in the indictment, but that appears to be the theory.

If that's the theory, then the indictment must descend into particulars, and it must say that she did not — that she specifically intended that they would be harmed, which means she specifically intended they wouldn't make any money.

They didn't allege that --

THE COURT: You may be -- perhaps your language is a little too precise, that they wouldn't profit from it.

MR. ALONSO: That's not what they are saying. That's not what they are saying. They are saying promised returns. I don't know what that means. That's vague. So we are not prepared to concede profit. Perhaps if we were drafting this anew, perhaps that's what they meant. That's not where we are. We have a grand jury who heard evidence and who returned these exact words, so we are stuck with these words. So they are saying the promised returns. So they did not properly allege that Ms. Shah intended that they would not make the promised returns. That's not what they are saying. They are saying at no point did she form the intent that they would make the returns. Those are two very different things.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ALONSO: There are cases in the Second Circuit,

including in the wire fraud context. The *Shellef* case, that we cite in our reply brief, is relatively on point, where the Second Circuit applied this principle to wire fraud, where the government had not laid out that the misrepresentations went to the benefit of the bargain.

There are other cases -- the *Pirro* case is a famous one, where Judge Parker dismissed that indictment, the Second Circuit up held it. So there is not -- it is not enough, as I think Judge Sand says, it's not enough to sort of say these kind of generalities and then -- by the government, and then say, okay, Judge, that's it. We rarely dismiss indictments in this courthouse. I get it. We rarely dismiss indictments in this courthouse. This is one that should be dismissed. Not just for that reason. There is a second reason we allege it should be dismissed, your Honor.

They didn't allege materiality. It is extremely ironic that they are relying on all we need to do is allege the elements, that's all we need to do, yet this element they didn't allege.

THE COURT: When you are talking about an investment, isn't materiality inferred? That is, you are making alleged misrepresentations in regard to investment, it is — the alleged misrepresentation is you are going to make money, you are going to profit.

MR. ALONSO: If this were a stock investment case or

real investment case, I might agree. This is not an investment case at all. This is a purchase of services. These are contracts to purchase coaching services.

I expect the government will tell you that everyone who bought coaching services got coaching services. Right? That everybody who paid for whatever these business services are -- again, we want them to particularize them -- but they are not going to contest, I suspect, that they got what they paid for.

So it's completely different than an investment case. And, frankly, I don't know that it was material. We point out in our --

THE COURT: I don't think -- we will hear from the government.

MR. ALONSO: No, no.

THE COURT: I don't think they are going to say they got what they paid for.

MR. ALONSO: No.

THE COURT: The argument -- if it's like the *Ketabchi* trial --

MR. ALONSO: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- the argument is that they got some piece of junk, as it were --

MR. ALONSO: I agree that there --

THE COURT: -- that allegedly is a coaching service or

a business opportunity, but there was no substance to it. It was a nothing. But they got something.

MR. ALONSO: I agree they are not going to concede that there was, but the fact is that the contracts at issue did contract for coaching services. I don't think there is going to be any question that they got it. I don't think even these prosecutors have alleged that substandard services are criminal. What they are saying is, in connection with selling these services, salespeople, not Ms. Shah, but salespeople somewhere across the country, said things, like made promises that people would be making money, not on their investments, it's not an investment, on their fee that they are paying for these services. Right? That's their theory.

And how -- first of all, they haven't said material. I can show you lots of indictments within the Second Circuit that say "by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises." There are cases that we have cited -- the *Ivic* case is one, there are others -- where implied elements of crimes are -- must be alleged. And the element of materiality is not on the face of 1341. It must be alleged.

The Neder case, the Supreme Court held that materiality is an element of mail and wire fraud and bank fraud, right? It wasn't so obvious in 2000, or 1999, whenever that case was decided. It wasn't so obvious. Right? Because

the Supreme Court had a circuit split before it. And it decided materiality is an element.

Okay. Since then, you can see all around the country, indictments say "materially false." Were these material or not? That's -- that may be a question for the jury, but they have to allege it in the indictment, and they didn't.

So if I can move on -- is there water somewhere?

THE COURT: I don't know if the government supplies water. You know what, sir, let me give you mine. There you are. I have not opened it. As a matter of fact, Ms. Blakely, do we have a cup or something, where we can save some of the judge's water for the judge?

MR ALONSO: Judge, I appreciate your kindness. You don't have to --

MS. FLETCHER: Judge, the government --

MR ALONSO: -- do that.

MS. FLETCHER: We will supply water.

MR. ALONSO: I appreciate the government's kindness.

I'm glad she did it in open court, so everybody saw it. Thank
you very much, Ms. Fletcher.

Moving on to the bill of particulars motion, your Honor, as I said, it is related, and it is basically related because defending this case has been and will continue to be like boxing with ghosts, right?

So the government has alleged a nine-year conspiracy

to commit wire fraud with some unspecified number of coconspirators, with unnamed, you know, sales floors, and with victims that we don't know who they are. So when I say boxing with ghosts, I really mean it.

They are pointing, they are saying, listen, you don't need us to particularize. Literally, they have responded to our request by, no, no, no, that's not really required. We don't have to do that here, because we have given you a boatload of discovery.

Now, they have given us a boatload of discovery.

That's clear. We have said in our -- I said in my declaration more than a million pages. I think that grossly understates it.

THE COURT: I saw that argument.

MR. ALONSO: It's millions and millions of pages.

Now, it is great that they gave that to us. A lot of it is from <code>Ketabchi</code>, which, by the way, I submit has nothing to do with this case. It may be a similar theory of theirs, but we can't have a road map to what our trial is. We don't want the evidence. We just want the particulars. What is he charging — what is he charging us with, the government? So we can't do that from the <code>Ketabchi</code> case. It's completely different. You know, it's completely a different matter with different players.

So what we are asking for, we had originally asked for

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seven items. You said, your Honor, what are we abandoning? We are now asking for five, right? In response to the -- our motions, the government put forward a statement of facts, which gives us at least a little bit of information. So what we are asking for now is basically the coconspirators, the victims, the sales floors, the money laundering activity, and one more thing, which escapes me at this moment, but it's in my reply brief.

So what is crucial here is basically to be able to know what is it that we have to defeat, right? So in science, you need -- a falsifiable proposition is something that can be attacked. Right? Same thing in law. Right? So what are they saying? Right? They are saying there are -- there are literally thousands and thousands of names of leads in the discovery materials. I don't know which ones apply to Ms. Shah. I don't know which ones they are saying were victimized. I don't know which ones they are saying were intended to be victimized. So we could very easily pick out a hundred of them, do a great job in front of the jury, and show that those people were not defrauded at all, or certainly that Ms. Shah knew nothing about it, what does she know about what the sales floors are saying? We could show all that and then they could come up and say no, no, it's these other 100 people we are alleging.

The point is, if you are going to allege that somebody

enhancement for it, right, which specifically talks about more than ten victims over 55 -- if you are going to allege somebody is being victimized, tell us who. Let's talk about what we are trying here. Let's join issue. Otherwise, we have millions of pages and we are almost literally at sea in terms of wading through those pages.

Now, they said -- I anticipate that they will clarify, but in their response, they said essentially that they allege that some unspecified number of telemarketing operations with which Ms. Shah allegedly worked were always defrauding people. Now, if that's the case, I think they need to say that clearly. That's not what they have said clearly.

And if they are saying that, then we have a different issue. Right? Then we have an issue of, okay, well, what's the case about? I mean, there are still millions and millions of people here.

So I think they do need to clarify, and I would -THE COURT: I'm not sure what that means, millions and
millions of people here.

MR. ALONSO: Well, millions and millions of pages which shows thousands and thousands of victims in there.

And by the way, more than a hundred sales floors are listed there. Which ones are we supposed to defend against?

THE COURT: Listed where?

MR. ALONSO: Listed within the discovery. We have cited --

THE COURT: In discovery.

MR. ALONSO: Yes.

And coconspirators. You know, there is very good case law that the government hasn't really addressed about factors courts are supposed to consider in terms of giving over coconspirators. I want know who are we supposed to defend against. This is not a case where there is any danger here. Ms. Shah, obviously, is not somebody who poses a danger to anybody. So it would not be difficult for the government to tell us, okay, it's these ten people, it's not these other 20 people. That way we could all focus — everybody here, your Honor, us and the prosecution — on what the case is about.

Also related, your Honor, if I could move on --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ALONSO: -- is the Brady issue.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ALONSO: So we obviously, we obviously had made a point this morning and in our papers about what exactly are the misrepresentations here. In the *Brady* context, it's been clear, it's become clear, just from this motion practice, that there is material out there that's favorable to the defense that the government hasn't identified for us.

THE COURT: Wait. The -- I take it you are not

arguing that -- or are you, that in the discovery material, which you say is billions of documents, the government has to tell you what is exculpatory and what's not. Is that your argument?

MR. ALONSO: I am saying that in part. Right? I am saying that in part and, I have some authority, which I am happy to discuss with the Court. The issue is that, if you have got this quantity of material, right, you can't expect the defense to wade through it in a lifetime.

THE COURT: Indeed. I want to hear what the government has told you — because obviously there are things the government has told you that the Court is unaware of — in terms of how that discovery has been organized and, indeed, what they have — the information they have given you about the victims. So in broad view, yeah, they can't just dump things on you for millions of pages. But I don't think you have authority that says the government has to tell you what's exculpatory and what's not.

MR. ALONSO: I do have some authority for that, your Honor. I just don't have it this far in advance of trial.

Right? But I think the principle applies.

So there are two cases -- Gil in the Second Circuit and St. Germain -- which is a case of Judge McMahon here in the Southern District, which I have cited, where the government did turn over material days before trial. In the Gil case, it was

a memorandum that was buried among, you know, some 2700 documents. In the *St. Germain* case, it was transcripts that were also — that were similarly buried. Neither was identified as what it was, which is something that was specifically helpful to the defense.

And in the *Gil* case, the Second Circuit reversed that conviction, even though the government argued — and I know this from painful experience. I argued the case on behalf of the United States at least before the motion panel in *Gil*, and the government argued that the document had been turned over. The defense had it. They had it five days before trial.

That's what I argued to the Second Circuit. I lost, because the Second Circuit said — Judge Jacobs didn't like that the government had buried it. I didn't try the case, so thank God I'm not the one who buried it, but that it had been inside five boxes of 3500 material, right, when it was something that was clearly favorable to the defense.

In the $St.\ Germain$ case, Judge McMahon made a similar analysis.

But it all goes back to the *Bortnovsky* principle.

Right? This is the motion for a bill of particulars. Right?

Bortnovsky reversed a denial of the bill of particulars, and your Honor is obviously familiar with the case I know --

THE COURT: I know Bortnovsky.

MR. ALONSO: -- and as I wrote in my papers, it was a

quainter time when 4,000 documents was deemed to be a lot by the Second Circuit. You can't just give 4,000 documents and expect the defense to glean it. Well, we are well beyond 4,000 documents here.

So I think it is the same principle, and it is driven home by what's happened just since this motion practice.

Right? In the motion practice, in the Franks motion, which we are abandoning, because the government has represented that they are not going to offer anything that was seized pursuant to those two warrants, so we are abandoning that, but because of that motion practice, and some of those facts related to the grand jury motion as well, it has become clear that there is exculpatory material within the discovery material and there may be things outside of it. Right? It's not just the evidence that they have given us. The discovery material are things — are documents and presumably things they might try to introduce or other.

But generally speaking, they haven't given us notes and memoranda and things like that. They have given us some of it. But what the government did in its response is it said to the Court, Ms. Shah's lawyers identified a document, one document, which is a compliance coaching script, and that document, which we did identify, we said, look, this document says that the promises of returns — the central theory of the case — were specifically being disclaimed at the time of the

sale. They may argue as a factual matter that that was part of the scheme. Maybe they will say that. But certainly it is something that goes to materiality, goes to intent to defraud, goes to fraud in itself, and we are entitled to have that.

So when you have got the theory that --

THE COURT: This is a 2011 document that you have attached to your papers?

MR. ALONSO: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ALONSO: Exactly right. And if I could finish, because this is, I think, actually very, very important.

This kind of information that promises were specifically disclaimed at the time of sale, if the theory is promises were specifically made at the time of sale, it's clearly favorable to the defense. Maybe they have a way to defeat it, maybe they don't. It's clearly favorable. We identified the one document, a cursory review, because I thought — I think there is something in here. Let's find it. Of course, we found one document. Okay? We attached it to our papers.

The government comes back and says, that document doesn't prove anything, because we only got that document on March 25, 2021. That happens to be the date of the indictment in this case, so I doubt it was presented to the grand jury, but they got it on that day.

We then went back to the drawing board and said, wait a minute, that doesn't make any sense. In a case of false promises of returns, how could they only have gotten this document the day they went to indict Ms. Shah? And the answer is they didn't. They have had it for years. We found it in the very first *Ketabchi* production that they made, right? So they have had that document for years.

And what's more, it doesn't make sense that there is just one document. Right? They say in their response that we only identified two documents — a contract and one script.

Okay. So we went back to the drawing board and we found eight more. It's all attached to our papers now. So it's clear that there is lots of stuff like this out there, probably not just within the discovery material, which they should identify for us, but also within the heads of the agents. Right?

The agents say in the affidavits, and probably before the grand jury, they interviewed a hundred people and none of them made any money. First of all, that's not fraud obviously. The result by itself isn't fraud. But let's just take that moment a moment.

Okay. But what about the people they didn't interview? How did they decide not to? Who are they? Do they know about people who made money or who will admit to having promises disclaimed? Those are very important pieces. And of course *Brady* material and *Giglio* material doesn't need

to be written down. It has to be in the minds of the investigative team, including all the agents.

So I think this is just a very, very important point about that. Under the *Gil*, *Bortnovsky* principle, they have to identify it, and I think that the Court should order them to do a more thorough review for this exact piece, for this exact piece about promises being made about returns.

Which brings me to my grand jury motion. Very well aware, your Honor, that in this courthouse it is very rare for the Court to go beyond a facially valid grand jury indictment, which is, of course, presumed valid, putting aside the other complaints we have about the face of this indictment.

Our motion papers, I think, have established pretty clearly that the agents in this case pretty regularly either made or passed on false statements about Ms. Shah about this scheme in sworn affidavits to the magistrates. That is a serious allegation. We don't make it lightly. But they told the magistrates that the purchasers were promised returns on their investments without saying — without clarifying that misleading statement, oh, listen, Judges, you should know, there were conversations at the time and scripts and contracts that said exactly the opposite of what we just swore to you. They did not tell the magistrates that. They actually told the magistrates, as well, that Ms. Shah operated two companies that she didn't operate; that she was affiliated with, that she

worked for, perhaps, but did not operate. And their attempt to use operate --

THE COURT: What does "operate" mean when she is listed, I think, as a vice president of marketing or something of that nature? What does "operate" mean?

MR. ALONSO: Well, vice president of marketing, if you look at that chart, is middle management. Right? It's not the -- "operating" in terms of a company means --

THE COURT: Conceding your point for purposes of discussion, I would say it's middle management as opposed to middle management.

MR. ALONSO: Well, that's not what the agent said. The agent didn't say anything like --

THE COURT: What does "operate" mean?

MR. ALONSO: "Operate" means what the Oxford English dictionary says it means, which is that it means to work machinery or to direct the activities of a company. Right? That's what it says in the footnote where we cited the dictionary --

THE COURT: So the operator is the CEO.

MR. ALONSO: It also -- actually, I think -- I think the easiest way for everybody here to interpret --

THE COURT: Aren't you parsing it far too fine for purposes of 6(e)? You started off by saying it's true that review of grand jury minutes is rarely permitted here.

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THE COURT: Isn't this sort of, you will forgive me,

an eye shade approach to the word "operate"?

MR. ALONSO: I think that --

MR. ALONSO: I think that "operate" means what it means in chief operating officer, but I will concede your Honor's point that the much stronger point is the part about no one -- that the statements no one made any money and the statements about the promised returns. Right? There were promised returns maybe, but there were also specific conversations saying we are not promising you anything. wasn't -- I'm going to take -- it's a very reasonable inference that those agents went in front of that grand jury and said what's in the indictment, which is that they were not making money on their promised returns, and that is a misleading statement. I submit that if the government had heard that statement in the grand jury from a subpoenaed witness and they knew all of the information we have set out, they might start an investigation for obstruction of justice. That's a very serious thing. I don't have the grand jury minutes, so I don't know what was there.

THE COURT: Let me ask a slightly different question $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$

MR. ALONSO: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- because I'm intrigued by your making money argument. If you purchase business opportunities for a

thousand dollars, that's how much money you put in, and it yields \$20, have you made money?

MR. ALONSO: Yes. Now, you have not made profit, but you have made money. And if it's ambiguous to you and me having this conversation here, what was it to the grand jury or to the magistrate judges who heard that from the agent? I mean "no one makes money" can mean different things. Now, that person made money.

And I would also submit that that person may have been perfectly happy with the services. That may not be a fraud at all. Right? That person bought services, paid for services, and got \$20 out of it. We don't know if they lost interest. I mean, this --

THE COURT: I purchased a business opportunity for a thousand dollars. At some point I receive \$20 back. I am so happy. Is that your argument?

MR. ALONSO: No, your Honor. My argument is that this is not as simple as the government has painted it. I recognize --

THE COURT: That may be.

MR. ALONSO: I recognize that this is --

THE COURT: That may be. You may have statements of, you know, we don't promise any specific rate of return, and you may have people on sales floors saying something very different. So it's not as simple as it appears.

MR. ALONSO: Right.

THE COURT: That's true. But you have presumption of regularity. We don't -- you just are saying -- you have made arguments on behalf of the government. The court system, through Rule 6(e), is highly protective of grand jury proceedings, and I assume at some point in your career, given what you said this morning, you in fact argued them.

MR. ALONSO: Absolutely. Of course. But right now --

THE COURT: And you want me here, if I understand -- I don't think this is one of your best arguments. You can tell my view. You want me here to permit disclosure of grand jury minutes to breach grand jury secrecy on the theory that somebody is just hunky-dory because they made \$20 on a thousand-dollar investment.

MR. ALONSO: Well, first of all, that's a hypothetical that your Honor put forward --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ALONSO: -- but --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ALONSO: -- I will say that what I am asking for right now is for your Honor to look at it. I'm not asking right now for you to give it to us immediately. But what I'm saying is, if it's true that they made these misleading statements before the grand jury, it's not just about the

making money. Right? I submitted a testimonial from a customer on my reply brief --

THE COURT: No, I saw that.

MR. ALONSO: -- who made \$55,000.

THE COURT: I saw that.

MR. ALONSO: Yeah, so the question is, right, if they are saying no one --

THE COURT: I won't ask if you have interviewed that person. The name was blacked out on my copy. Go ahead.

MR. ALONSO: Right. The -- by the way, that testimonial was among 3600 pages of things the government gave us. A lot of them do have these low amounts.

But again, we all understand how this works. Right? If you are being sold something that is coaching for your business, you have to actually work on it. Right? The fact that somebody didn't make money doesn't mean that they would say, help, help, I have been defrauded. They might have lost interest. They might have not done the work. Right? I mean, if you are getting web services or coaching services, whatever, even if it was substandard stuff, right, they still have to go out and do it and sell. Right? And no one is blaming the victims here. I am just saying that the fact that somebody made \$20 on a thousand-dollar investment is certainly no evidence, without much more, that that's fraud. But the agents kept saying no one made money, no one made

money. We have put forward evidence that people did make money. So all I am asking is for you to read the minutes, and if they show what I think they show, then at that point we would like to make motions on it.

THE COURT: All right. What else?

MR. ALONSO: All right. So on the *Giglio* motion, this is the enforcement of the Rule 5(f) order that your Honor entered in late May, we are seeking simply for you to enforce it. The government has declined to obey your Honor's order. They didn't object when we moved for it. They are now saying, I think —

THE COURT: Are you talking about the disclosure of 3500 material?

MR. ALONSO: Not 3500. Your Honor ordered that both impeachment and exculpatory material be identified --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ALONSO: -- promptly upon its being discovered.

Obviously we would be reasonable about this. We are not looking for every little thing. They don't know exactly what's inconsistent with their witnesses. But they know lots of it. Right? They know who the cooperators are. They know what the impeachment material is that they have now.

THE COURT: You are asking that the impeachment material be turned over immediately.

MR. ALONSO: I suppose --

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1 THE COURT: Identified. 2 MR. ALONSO: Promptly upon it's being identified, 3 which is what your Honor ordered. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. ALONSO: So I don't honestly understand --6 THE COURT: Fair enough. 7 MR. ALONSO: -- their argument here. And I will call your Honor's attention to our reply 8 9 brief, where I point out how they have also misrepresented 10 your Honor's order. They said that your Honor's order makes 11 clear the *Giglio* material need not be produced immediately upon 12 its identification, when you said the opposite. They said that 13 the Giglio order does not expressly address the defendant who 14 appears intent on proceeding to trial when your order said the 15 opposite. So all we ask for is enforcement of that order. And, again, we will be reasonable. We are not saying give us 16 everything right now indexed. We will talk about it. 17 18 THE COURT: Well, October is coming up fast. 19 MR. ALONSO: Assuming that's the real date, but we 20 are --21 THE COURT: Why not? I haven't heard anything 22 otherwise. 23 MR. ALONSO: Well, we just had an informal discussion 24 beforehand, and I'm sure we will talk about it more, as to

whether the Court can try three defendants. That's all.

THE COURT: I have an October date here for this 1 2 trial. 3 MR. ALONSO: And we would like to go to trial in 4 October, just to be clear, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 MR. ALONSO: And finally, finally, we have the 7 question of the suppression motion. We urge the Court to order a suppression hearing. All right? We do have --8 9 THE COURT: I do want to hear from the government why 10 that doesn't make sense. It seems to me it is worthwhile 11 having the hearing, so I have a better sense of what's 12 happened. 13 MR. ALONSO: Thank you, your Honor. The basic point 14 is that we have submitted sufficient sworn allegations here, and the government has submitted nothing but unsworn 15 statements and arguments in their legal argument. So I don't 16 17 know why they didn't submit an affidavit from Detective Bastos --18 19 THE COURT: Well, they don't have to do that. I saw 20 you are trying to get them on the record. They don't have to 21 do that. They can have him testify at the hearing. 22 MR. ALONSO: Well, that would be fine with us, your 23 Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 MR. ALONSO: So in sum, boxing with ghosts. We urge

you to dismiss the indictment. But if you don't do that, we really do need a lot more information if we have any chance to actually approach these charges.

THE COURT: All right. I think that's a fair way to summarize your argument. Okay.

MR. ALONSO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Government. Who is the boxer?

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, I have the honor of addressing your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, would you like me to go in any particular order or should I address them in the way the defense counsel addressed them?

THE COURT: That probably makes the most sense.

MR. SOBELMAN: Okay. Starting with the defendant's motion to dismiss, his argument entirely ignored the *Klein* case, which was decided by the Second Circuit in 2007. It found "no error" in a bank fraud indictment that did not "explicitly use the word 'material' because materiality can be inferred to be an element of criminal fraud because of the well understood meaning of fraud as a legal term."

That holding is directly applicable here. There is no way to distinguish it. Defense counsel says, well, that's plain error review. But the circuit found no error, not no plain error. No error. And every other circuit to have

addressed this issue, and we cited cases in our brief, have come out the same way, as have all the district courts that we were able to find that have rendered decisions on this in this district.

The idea that you have to use the magic word

"material" in an indictment has no support in the case law.

The court doesn't have to engage in the sort of like trying to read a specific facts --

THE COURT: Your argument is the "material" can be inferred. Is that what your argument is?

MR. SOBELMAN: It can be inferred in two ways. One, just based on the charge itself, under the *Klein* case. Two, there is a series of cases, including some in this circuit and courts of appeals, that say that where the word "fraud" or "defrauded" or the allegations involve fraud, it can be inferred.

And then there is yet a third set of cases, in case the first two weren't persuasive -- and the first is binding -- in case the first two aren't persuasive that say that the facts in an indictment, taken in favor of the government, can be read to infer materiality.

So there is really no need to parse the indictment the way that defense counsel wants the Court to. I am happy to go through the indictment in that kind of detail, but unless the Court finds that for some reason *Klein* does not apply, I don't

see how this argument can possibly be meritorious.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: I want to make just one other note, which is, defense counsel keeps trying to put this case in a particular box that is an outdated notion of a quote/unquote false promise case and wants to cast it as some kind of breach of contract. Obviously that's not what we have here. The false promise line of cases was from before the 1343 was amended to include pretenses and representations. We have all three in this case. This is not merely something was promised in a contract and something else was given. As your Honor knows and I think acknowledged, it's a much more complicated set of facts than that, and we don't think it is appropriate to put it in that box, and therefore those cases would not apply.

I just want to make two other notes, and then I will move on to the next motion, unless your Honor has questions.

One is, defense counsel keeps saying an intent to harm is an element. It is not. As your Honor instructed in the *Ketabchi* case, an intent to defraud is an element of the underlying object.

Which leads me to my final point, which is, this is a conspiracy case. It is about an agreement. It is not about specific -- and we will have evidence of this at trial, but it is not about a specific transaction. And defense counsel keeps

trying to use case law that has applied in sort of isolated incident cases -- and this is the same as the bill of particulars which I will get to in a moment -- to try to import that case law into this circumstance where the case law has been very clear it does not apply.

Just very briefly, Shellef, the 2007 Second Circuit case, has no application here. Defense counsel referenced it in his argument in his reply brief. Your Honor, that case actually supports our argument. It makes a distinction between cases where — it's really sort of in the puffery jurisprudence cases, where there is sort of an incidental comment or lie told that's not really the basis of a bargain in a purchase or sale fraud. Here, as your Honor knows from the Ketabchi case and from the indictment, the representations that were made in the course of the conspiracy were critical and central to the purchase or sale of these business and — business services and products, and we have alleged, and intend to prove, that without those the transactions almost certainly would not have occurred, which, again, is materiality, but it's simply not using the magic word in the indictment.

I also just want to note, as factual matter, defense counsel keeps characterizing his client as someone who brokered leads. That certainly is an important part of her conduct, and one that we layed out in our five-page detailed summary of her conduct in our opposition, but she also ran a

BizOp floor in New York City that was directly selling to customers. This is not someone who is sort of aloof from what was going on on the ground. She was running the ground troops. So the suggestion that we are not going to prove that at trial is going to be false.

Anything else on the motion to dismiss, your Honor, before I turn to the bill of particulars?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: With respect to the bill of particulars, we have the same problem, where defense counsel wants to use cases related to isolated incident crimes and try to import them into sort of a continuing scheme or a long-running conspiracy crime that we have here. So Bortnovsky involved a set of a few isolated fraudulent incidents that was within a much larger set of transactions, and the government didn't adequately identify the handful, literal handful of fraudulent incidents that were at issue.

Now, cases like *Tuzman*, which is an SDNY case, have explained that, for a bill of particulars, there are two types of cases to apply the principles. One is what I would call isolated incidents or handful of incident cases, like *Bortnovsky*; and then there is another category, which we are very much in, which is long-running scheme where, as *Tuzman* puts it, all or most of the conduct is alleged to be unlawful. That's where we are, all or most.

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The BizOp floors that the defendant run -- ran, all or most of that conduct, in our view, was unlawful. The leads that she was brokering, all or most of that conduct, in our view, was unlawful. That's what the allegation is. It's clear in the indictment. It's clear in our motion papers. clear to defense counsel. There is no hiding the ball here. We are not going to put on a trial where we say there were three victims that were defrauded over the course of several years. We may not have a hundred victims testify at trial -it will probably be more on the order of what testified at the Ketabchi trial -- but certainly there will be ample testimony and documentary evidence and communications showing this was a comprehensive, long-running scheme, and not something where there is a handful of isolated incidents.

So where does that leave us? It leaves us in the bill of particulars context with a whole series of cases that we cite in our brief, like Cuti, Guttenberg, where the Courts say, for these types of cases, a bill of particulars asking for the things that the defendant wants are not appropriate.

Bonaventure, which is a Judge Swain decision from 2013. They have cited no case, and the government is not aware of one where the Court has required the type of disclosures that they are requesting in a case like this. It is just not in that category.

THE COURT: No, but what about -- step back. You have

got a minimum of a million documents here. They are swimming in documents. It's no longer 4,000, to use Mr. Alonso's point. They say they have no idea what they ought to be looking at. How are you assisting them in that?

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, we have been readily available to them. We have had phone conversations. We have had videoconferences. We have written letters, that I will talk about in a second, that were attached to the defendant's motion, including one -- you know, one of the things he asked for today was the things he wants are coconspirators, victims, sales floors. One thing he couldn't remember. I don't know what the thing he couldn't remember is, but coconspirators, victims, sales floors, we gave them a list, a while ago now, of 41 --

THE COURT: Well, you haven't listed all the coconspirators.

MR. ALONSO: We haven't -- I'm not sure that's true, but we haven't committed to a final, binding list. The bill of particulars asked here, your Honor, does not have a legal basis and it is purely strategic. We gave them a list in good faith, as comprehensive as we could make it, of 41 individuals and entities that are sales floors, fulfillment floors, and coconspirators, and other people who may not be coconspirators but were involved in the operations that the defendant was involved in, to try to help them narrow their focus.

But every time we answer a question from defense counsel, there is ten more follow-up questions. And we answer as many as we can, but they always want more. It is never enough. And that is not how the bill of particulars law works.

What we have given is enough. It's more than enough. And the volume of discovery does not call for a bill of particulars here. First of all, they have shown that they are quite deft at navigating the discovery. They have a coordinating discovery attorney who has a comprehensive database for them, called Casepoint, that all their materials get put into and is searchable by them. We actually don't have something like that. When they put in a document and said, oh, the government had this before the search warrant, we were able to look at the Bates number and tell that particular version we did not have because it was on our production log which they also have and showing when we produced it to them, which is usually very shortly after we receive it.

They were then able to go back apparently and query and find other versions of the same document that we had produced in earlier productions. We actually don't even have the ability to do those kind of queries across all of our documents. So I don't know the inner workings of how they are dealing with the discovery; but, frankly, if anything, they are in equipoise with us, but what they have suggested so far makes me think they are actually much further ahead of where we

are.

And in any event, so although I understand the Court wants to have a trial in October, we want to have a trial in October, defense wants to have a trial in October, the remedy for "we have a lot of materials to get through" is not to bind the government to a bill of particulars to give essentially an early witness list and an early exhibit list. It's to give the defense more time. If their assertion is, you know, from March to October is not enough time, given the volume of materials, the government would have no objection to them having additional time. It would be a perfectly reasonable ask.

But instead, they don't ask for that. They say we want a trial soon and we want to bind the government and put a strategic limitation on them, even though we know their investigation is ongoing. Your Honor, we are meeting with witnesses in the case every single week, and they know from discovery we are continuing to obtain new materials. It is simply not called for here.

Unless your Honor has any other questions about the bill of particulars, I can move on to the *Brady* motion.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor is absolutely correct that we have no duty to identify specific materials and I really don't think the defense or the Court really wants that to be our job. We are not an adjunct of the defense.

Every Court of Appeals, about half of them have considered a request like this, and I can give the citations to your Honor. We cited the most recent one, which is the Fourth Circuit, the Yi case, in our brief, but there are another five circuits or so that have considered this, and they have all rejected it.

It is not the duty of the government to try to figure out, document by document or communication by communication, what is potentially useful to the defense. Our obligation is to produce the materials that might be potentially useful to them, not to go through and provide them a road map. I'm not even sure if anyone wants us making those judgments, because we could be wrong, which is why we take an "abundance of caution" approach. We produce virtually everything that's provided to us from third parties and that we obtain.

The only things that haven't been produced at this point are some, but not all, witness statements. As defense counsel acknowledged, we have provided witness statements and — usually in letter form disclosing specific statements that are made that we view as potentially useful or helpful to the defense. We take these obligations really seriously. There is no need and really no showing that would require the Court going back — requiring us to go back and do additional work.

That being said, we are continually reviewing and

re-reviewing the small subset of items we have not produced to make sure we can't come up with some theory that is useful to the defense. And at certain points when we are reviewing, we find things and we say, you know what, in light of what they have said and the way the case is going, this actually might fall into that category, and we are constantly taking the "abundance of caution" approach.

In any event, we have proposed a mutual pretrial disclosure schedule to the defense. We proposed it a month ago.

THE COURT: I don't think I have seen that, is that right?

MR. SOBELMAN: No, your Honor. It is between the parties. We told defense, look, let's try to agree on 3500 and Giglio deadlines and other things sort of keyed off of your Honor's motions in limine deadline, expert disclosures, things like that. We haven't heard back substantively. They said they got it and they would get back to us. We haven't heard back. We are eager to make sure that they are comfortable with the amount of time that we are going to give them for 3500 and Giglio material. We don't want to have a trial by surprise. We want to make sure that, in case there were a statement in some document that we didn't view as potentially favorable to them, but they want to follow up on, they have the time to do that.

We are not going to give 3500 the Friday before trial like in *Gil*. I think our proposal is much longer than that. don't know exactly where we will land after they hopefully respond to us, but we don't anticipate it being last minute. As your Honor may remember in *Ketabchi*, I believe we produced 3500 about two weeks out from what ended up being the trial date. That seemed to work very well. We may land on a date even further out here or closer, depending on how the discussions go.

And your Honor, I will just note we, as a courtesy, in response to their request, produced all of the 3500 from the Ketabchi case already --

THE COURT: Yes, I saw that.

MR. SOBELMAN: -- all the exhibits. So -- and some of the witnesses may overlap. So they have the *Giglio* for those particular witnesses who we may call in this case. So they are actually at a much more significant advantage than the *Ketabchi* defendants were. And as your Honor saw in that case, defense counsel had no problem putting on a vigorous and able defense.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Alonso is saying that case has nothing to do with this case.

MR. SOBELMAN: We think he is wrong and that your Honor will see that at the trial. And we think it is evident from our briefing and the indictment that that's simply not true.

Was Ms. Shah a defendant in that case? Of course not. But it's the same theory. It's the same group of actors. We expect some of the witnesses may overlap. I think it will be strikingly similar, that these two defendants' roles were slightly different than the roles of the two defendants who went to trial in *Ketabchi*. They are much higher up on the chain.

THE COURT: Who is much higher up on the chain?

MR. SOBELMAN: Ms. Shah and Mr. Brewster. I am

referring to the defendants represented here today. And

Mr. Allen. All three defendants we expect to go to trial are

much higher up on the chain than Mr. Owimrin, O-W-I-M-R-I-N, or

Mr. Shahram, S-H-A-H-R-A-M, or Ketabchi were.

THE COURT: You misspelled Shahram.

MR. SOBELMAN: Sorry. I'm doing it on the fly.

THE COURT: S-H-A-R-A-M.

MR. SOBELMAN: Ms. Fletcher thinks the Court is wrong, but --

THE COURT: That may be, but she will keep that to herself. Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: She tried to.

THE COURT: We will make sure the spelling is correct.

I don't mean to be flip. We will make sure the spelling is correct. Proceed.

MR. SOBELMAN: In any event, your Honor, one other

point, which is, the suggestion that people agents may have not decided to -- have not interviewed, like disclose --

THE COURT: What about the -- Mr. Alonso's point about the 5(f) statement that requires promptly turning over *Giglio* material.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, I think that order, at best, is ambiguous. We read it the way we explained, which is that, because of the modifier that says, for example, before a plea there is no need for *Giglio* material to be produced, that would be inconsistent with a reading that as soon as *Giglio* material is identified it be produced.

But in any event, it is kind of an odd order if that is what it was meant to say, and we would ask that, to the extent the Court reads it that way, it be modified. We don't know what witnesses we are going to call at trial. We have some idea of who we may or may not call. But to produce Giglio material three months out from trial, one, it's inconsistent with practice in this district; two, it's completely unnecessary; and, three, we are not sure exactly what that would mean. So if that's what your Honor intended, we will do our best to comply with it, but we don't think that's what the Court —

THE COURT: As you phrase it, material three months out doesn't make sense. You are right about that. Although I will hear from Mr. Alonso on that.

MR. SOBELMAN: So, your Honor, we would propose, as we have to defense counsel, that we try to reach agreement on when 3500 and *Giglio* material be produced together and that it be done in the same way it is done in virtually every case in this district and seems to work quite well. There is nothing about this case that makes it different or special in that way.

THE COURT: Suppression.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor. I have a lot of paper here, if your Honor will give me a second to get control of it.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, the key point with respect to whether a hearing is appropriate is that the defendant's state of mind does not become relevant unless and until the defense makes a showing that there was some mental or physical coercion by the police. And the case --

THE COURT: That argument is a bit sideways, but that's really what the argument is. The argument is because Mr. Alonso's papers focus on the word "just" from Bastos, that is, she was being coerced into responding because he said "we just want to talk to you." I happen to think that's freighting that word with too much significance, but it would be helpful to get a better sense of it if I hear the people.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, I take your point, but even

if -- you know, it's not about the agents' intent. It is about what happened. So the fact --

THE COURT: No. They are arguing that the word "just" --

MR. SOBELMAN: I understand.

THE COURT: -- was misleading and coercive in a way.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, but I think in light of the rest of the facts, so the fact that before she -- before Detective Bastos supposedly said that, he told -- he and the other agents told the defendant -- and this is crediting her version of the fact -- that she was under arrest, she was placed in handcuffs, they then again, during the interrogation, remind her that she is under arrest. She is handcuffed the entire time. It's incredibly clear to any person what is going on. And there is no case where a Court has ordered a hearing or suppressed statements off of something so benign.

And even crediting the defendant's statements in her declaration, in light of the waiver — and I'm not sure if your Honor has listened to the audio of the interview, but it is crystal clear that she is not being coerced — in light of the tone, the demeanor, the way in which they carefully go through each of the items in the *Miranda* waiver; and the government's view — and I don't think this is a close call — is that even crediting that he said at some point, you know, look, trying to calm her, it seems, you know, Ms. Shah, we just want to talk to

you, we just want to make sure you are okay, that is in no way misleading.

This case is very much like *Colorado v. Spring*, where the allegation was, well, the defendants misled them by not --sorry, the agents misled the defendant by not saying, at the outset of the conversation, this is what you are charged with, and that is the same thing that happened here. There is nothing that the agents would say at a hearing that would modify what the word "just" meant, if we are crediting, for the purposes of the Court being able to dispose of this motion, that Detective Bastos said that.

But even if you credit that, it's just simply not misleading under the cases that apply to situations like this. So you don't get to the defendant's state of mind, because there simply is no coercion. I suppose if your Honor thought that saying some calming words like that was potentially coercive, I mean, rose to the level of police coercion, a hearing would be appropriate. But it just simply isn't as a matter of law. It is not — there is no factual dispute. We are crediting everything the defendant has said in her declaration for the purposes of this motion. But under the prevailing and applicable and controlling law, it just doesn't get defendant where she is trying to go.

THE COURT: All right. I understand your point.

I think that does it. Is there anything else?

MR. SOBELMAN: Let's see, your Honor.

In light of your Honor's reaction with respect to the grand jury minutes argument, I am happy to not address it, but if your Honor would like me to, I will.

THE COURT: Briefly, go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: Okay, your Honor. The --

THE COURT: I do think you have, by far, the better part of the argument, but let me hear it.

MR. SOBELMAN: We strongly agree. The quibbling about the definition of "operate" I think is emblematic of the defendant's argument here. We have one dictionary that has one definition. They say, no, please adopt a different definition. Just as in the Franks territory, this would make it entirely outside of what Franks would cover. If a word — if we are arguing over the definition of a word, it by definition could not have been, you know, intentionally misleading to the point where the suppression of a motion — suppression of a search warrant or the inspection of grand jury minutes could possibly be warranted.

And most of what Mr. Alonso's argument on the grand jury minutes was, was his defense or his client's defense, which is, we think the defense will put on a trial, and we are prepared to engage with that defense, which is, well, there are other facts from other people at other times that might cast doubt on the government's theory.

And the thing he relied most on was the testimonial, which of course the government didn't have at the time of the grand jury presentation, and Mr. Alonso well knows that. We just got it recently and promptly produced it to him.

But at the end of the day, his disagreement with you know, what "made money" might mean or what "operate" means takes this well out of the types of circumstances where an inspection of the grand jury minutes might be appropriate.

THE COURT: You are right on that.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, I think that's all the motions. I'm obviously happy to answer any questions the Court may have.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Alonso, did you want to briefly reply?

MR. ALONSO: Briefly, your Honor, just on a couple of things.

It sounds like the government agrees that we are going to trial, which means that the *Giglio* order is operative now.

Right? I mean, the statement that they are not required to produce *Giglio* before a guilty plea is an unremarkable recitation of Supreme Court law. So, we are going to trial, so we do urge the Court to hold them to that. And, again, yeah, if they don't know they are going to call somebody, we are not unreasonable here. We really -- we understand. But there is *Giglio* material they know about today that we should have.

I remembered the fifth piece, by the way, which I think is pretty important here on what we are asking for for the bill of particulars. There were seven in my opening papers, five in the reply. The fifth is the nature of the business services that they are claiming that Ms. Shah was responsible for selling or foisting on the so-called unsuspecting purchasers.

The reason that's important is because the indictment — the superseding indictment only mentions web services, tax preparation services, and coaching, and generally business services. But if we are supposed to use <code>Ketabchi</code> as a road map, I read their summation in <code>Ketabchi</code>, and we have got corporate credit, Youngevity, merchant terminal, tax prep, coaching services, corporate LLC, front—end web services, merchant account set—up services. You get the point. The idea is, we should at least know what theory we are supposed to be defending against. What is it they are saying that her conspiracy was selling to these purchasers? So that was the fifth piece, your Honor.

So on Bortnovsky, you know, I don't see how you distinguish that case in the picky way that the government suggested. There, there was a series of burglaries and only some of them were operative. Here I think I heard Mr. Swett say that all or most --

THE COURT: Mr. Sobelman.

MR. ALONSO: I'm sorry. Mr. Sobelman. My apologies.

THE COURT: Mr. Swett --

MR. ALONSO: I think I heard him say -- I'm sorry, Judge?

THE COURT: Mr. Swett has not said anything today.

MR. ALONSO: My apologies.

I think I heard Mr. Sobelman say that all or most of the conduct alleged here is unlawful. Well, I think we need to know whether it is all or most, and if it is most, which is it? Well, because --

THE COURT: Why is that?

MR. ALONSO: Because, Judge, if you saw --

THE COURT: Whoa, whoa. Why is that?

MR. ALONSO: Because if you saw the millions of pages that we have to look at, what is -- what does it mean to defend against this case? We could easily be trying two different cases. There could easily be ten conspiracies lurking within these papers. So if they are saying everything is -- so everything now is unlawful. "Unlawful" is the wrong word since we have an entire FTC regime here. But everything is criminal I understood him to be saying. Then, okay, so are we then allowed to -- what happens if we prove that 100 of the purchasers were perfectly satisfied or that Ms. Shah had nothing to do with certain leads? I just don't know what I am supposed to -- like I said, boxing with ghosts. What am I

supposed to defend against? That's the idea here. So if it is literally everything, I can't imagine it's literally everything, and I will add, and this goes to the point where --

THE COURT: I think that was their argument in Ketabchi.

MR. ALONSO: Perhaps, and it's also what they said in response to Brewster's motion. But that's not what they said in response to Ms. Shah's motion either in writing or here orally.

So -- just give me one second, please.

Intent to harm, Judge, that's Second Circuit case law. Right? That's the *D'Amato* case, where a mail fraud conviction was versed. Intent to harm comes from *D'Amato*. The Second Circuit considered *en banc* in *Rybicki*, which I also argued for the United States, and Judge Raggi, in her concurrence, was clear that that is what it requires.

So intent to harm is a different way to say intent to defraud. I'm not saying it is a new standard. It's a different way to say intent to defraud.

On materiality, I -- honestly I don't -- I don't understand their argument that *Klein* controls here, Judge, for a couple of reasons. It was based on plain error, so the only holding there is that it was not plain error, you know, for the district court to do what it had done. The statement "no error" is clearly *dicta*, because it was an unpreserved

argument that was raised for the first time on appeal. And as I pointed out, because it was plain error, it is a very short discussion.

This case presents a great opportunity for your Honor to really look at this issue. There is lots of case law that the Second Circuit in *Klein* did not address about having to — about having to literally state in haec verba the implied elements of particular crimes. That is Pirro, that's other cases, and the Second Circuit didn't even cover it. The Second Circuit seemed to say in that case, on plain error review, that of course materiality is part of fraud because that's just — fraud is materiality. And again, if that were the case, we would have never needed the Neder case. Right? Neder wouldn't have been necessary in the first place. The question presented to the Supreme Court there is, is materiality an element of mail fraud, wire fraud, or bank fraud.

On the *Miranda* question, I think your Honor is —based on your questions, I think you are hopefully leaning towards a suppression hearing.

THE COURT: Yes, but I actually try to listen intently to counsel --

MR. ALONSO: No, no.

THE COURT: -- and what Mr. Sobelman's argument was, an hour and 20 minute long tape combined with your client's affidavit showed that there is no issue but that there was no

coercion or misleading.

MR. ALONSO: The citation to the recording would be an excellent argument if we were arguing that the statement was coerced. That's not what we are arguing. We are arguing that the *Miranda* waiver was coerced. Right? It's a different argument. The statement itself flowed from the *Miranda* waiver, and everything we know about the statement comes from Ms. Shah's declaration. So the fact is that the --

THE COURT: But then that goes back to what I was saying, that you are putting 100 percent, 90 percent of your reliance on the word "just."

MR. ALONSO: No, your Honor. Mr. Sobelman specifically said that nothing the agent said was misleading. They specifically wrote in their complaint that the agent didn't say anything that was incorrect in response to her questions. What they wrote is exactly the opposite of what is in Ms. Shah's affidavit. She is asking questions, and she is asking lots of questions because — she is asking, Am I under arrest? What is this about? Am I going to jail? To her — she is less sophisticated, she is not a lawyer, she is not an agent — "am I under arrest/am I going to jail" are the same thing. She is asking those questions. Right? Clearly he was trying to mislead her, because what he wants is to get her sitting down and answering questions. And she wants —

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Go ahead. She wants?

MR. ALONSO: She wants to know what's going on, and he is simply lying to her, saying that he wants to make sure she is okay. Remember it's not just — it's not just "just." It is also "just want to make sure you are okay." Remember that she is the beneficiary of an order of protection from a New York judge, and this is a New York Police Department detective saying he wants to make sure she is okay. This cries out for a hearing your Honor. What she is saying uncontested, unrebutted —

THE COURT: She never even mentioned she disavows knowing the guy. It's apparently it is not as if she is really concerned about the --

MR. ALONSO: Well --

THE COURT: -- person who is mentioned in the order.

MR. ALONSO: All we have is her sworn statement that --

THE COURT: And in fact, according to the government, it is the very end of the interview.

MR. ALONSO: So this man had a temporary order of protection against him. He traveled to Utah, beat her up, was convicted — very rare in New York County — convicted of felony criminal contempt, and there is a five-year order of protection in her favor that expires in 2026.

THE COURT: No, but the government's point is if it really were bothering her, she certainly would have said that

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during the interview.

MR. ALONSO: Perhaps, your Honor, but when we are talking about these kind of situations, you know, women don't necessarily always jump up, particularly when they are handcuffed to a chair. This is not a friendly conversation, right? Listen, as I signaled to your Honor --

THE COURT: We don't have to argue it now, I don't think, but that cuts against your argument if particularly she is handcuffed to a chair, then she certainly knew it was not just a discussion.

MR. ALONSO: She is unsophisticated, your Honor.

This is not somebody -- whatever mastermind they want to say she is, she is not. She is not a sophisticated person. All she wanted to know -- she didn't know if her husband was okay. She did know if the New York Police Department detective had something to do with this horrible person who beat her up, who -- if you saw --

THE COURT: All right. I understand the argument. Let me think about that hearing point.

MR. ALONSO: All right.

THE COURT: I want to get into Mr. Poscablo.

MR. ALONSO: The only last piece I will refer to is on the discovery piece. I don't know -- I'm not going to say it's a disingenuous point, but the idea that they don't have access to the third-party database strikes me as odd, as I

1 assume --

THE COURT: They don't have access to Casepoint. It's paid for by the defendant.

MR. ALONSO: Okay. But it's not hard to get those kind of databases. They are ubiquitous in this world. To have a relatively --

THE COURT: That I can't say. That I don't know. I have the representation of Mr. Sobelman. That's all I can go on.

MR. ALONSO: But it might be a good argument if they were an ordinary litigant receiving discovery, but they have been investigating this case for five years. These documents came in bit by bit. Presumably the agents looked at them when they came in --

THE COURT: That doesn't mean they have a manipulable database.

MR. ALONSO: Right, but --

THE COURT: I don't know whether they do or not. I have Mr. Sobelman's statement.

MR. ALONSO: But they don't have to have a manipulable database. They have to question the agents to find out what is out there that's favorable to the defense.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ALONSO: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, before we turn to Mr. Brewster, may I respond on the hearing issue?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, just three very brief points.

First of all, the defendant was told, even under her version of the facts, that she was under arrest. They had an arrest warrant for her and placed her in handcuffs. There was no even arguable misleading about what was going on. That is her version of the facts.

I just want to underscore that, under Mitchell which we cite in our brief, a Second Circuit case from 1992, agents not answering questions is, as a matter of law, not misleading. So if the argument is she was asking questions that they were not answering, that is not something that cuts in her favor here.

And then the third and final point is, I just want to reiterate, under Salameh, which is a Second Circuit case from 1988, the Court cannot inquire into her state of mind, which is the most Mr. Alonso is talking about, unless and until it finds police coercion. So the order of protection, what might been in her head about that or not, even if you credit her affidavit on that, we don't get there because there is no coercion. There is no misleading. So he is trying to conflate the inquiry to make it seem like a hearing is necessary to hearing

from her or from an agent, but that's just not the case.

THE COURT: I don't know that we are going to hear from her. Presumably you would put the agent on.

MR. SOBELMAN: If your Honor thought that it was necessary. But we don't get to the part of the inquiry the defendant is focused on because even under the facts as she alleged them, there is no police coercion. It's not coercion to not answer a question. That's *Mitchell*. It's not coercion to be nice to someone and say, look, we just want to talk to you. It's going to be okay. It's not coercion to tell someone truthfully that they are under arrest and handcuff them.

And if your Honor listens to the audio recording, you hear that for several minutes where the Miranda warnings are given very simply. Some of them are repeated when she seems not to understand them or not to hear them, out of an abundance of caution. She executes the Miranda form. She is given an opportunity to fix her contact. The agents could not have been more accommodating in that part of the interview. And the descriptions by defense counsel in their brief — are there a few minutes later in the interview that get heated? Yes. They have nothing to do with the voluntary Miranda waiver. That happened an hour earlier. So there is really nothing for the Court to inquire into here.

THE COURT: I understand your point.

MR. SOBELMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's go to Mr. Poscablo. And let me try to get control of my paper here. Just a moment.

Yes. On behalf of Mr. Brewster, Mr. Poscablo.

MR. POSCABLO: May it please the Court: Good afternoon, your Honor, or is it still good morning? Nice to see you.

THE COURT: It's exactly noon. Proceed.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, as the Court is aware,
Mr. Brewster filed an omnibus motion seeking to suppress
evidence, including evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant, the suppression of certain unsupervised audio
recordings made by the failed cooperator Ryan Hult, and a
motion for bill of particulars. In our motion we also discuss
Brady, Giglio, and the Jencks Act material. But if I could
just start there very quickly, your Honor, I think that the
Court, and the government agrees, that the Court should enter
a Rule 5 order with regards to Mr. Brewster.

THE COURT: Haven't I gone done that already?

MR. POSCABLO: I'm not sure that you did. I can

confer with the government, but I don't think so with regards

to Mr. Brewster.

THE COURT: We will do that immediately if we haven't.

I will check ECF.

MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, your Honor.

I just want to address a couple of things that Mr. Sobelman said.

THE COURT: Just a moment.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Proceed.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, Mr. Sobelman, just to clarify and educate a little bit with regards to Casepoint, Casepoint is not as manipulable as Mr. Sobelman says, in particular because thousands of pages of documents that were inserted into Casepoint are photographs. There are literally photographs of documents, which renders them unsearchable, and that's a problem.

And the other thing that Mr. Sobelman mentioned is that the government produced all of the Jencks Act material from the prior trial, from the *Ketabchi* trial, 117 total witnesses they produced, which I don't think they called all those witnesses at trial, but they produced them. Those are also —

THE COURT: When you say they produced them, they produced the materials concerning, is that what you mean?

MR. POSCABLO: That's right, your Honor.

Also unsearchable. A lot of them are handwritten notes. So literally the defense will have to go through thousands -- hundreds or thousands of pages in order to do so. We have started that, and I will -- I can represent to your

Honor that Mr. Brewster's name can't be found in the batches that I have looked at.

They have also said, well, look, we have a transcript from the *Ketabchi* trial. Mr. Brewster's name did not appear in that transcript.

They also said, well, you have all the discovery from the *Ketabchi* trial. I did a -- I was able to run a search.

Mr. Brewster's name did not appear in that discovery. So I guess my point, though, is that they have buried the defense in mountains upon mountains of documents and they continue to do so. They did so last night. They produced another -
THE COURT: Just let me stop you. I am trying to

THE COURT: Just let me stop you. I am trying to understand it.

MR. POSCABLO: Yeah.

THE COURT: Doesn't what you have just told me show the ease of your excluding significant swaths of the material that has been given to you?

MR. POSCABLO: With regard to all the things in Ketabchi, the documents that they produced and the trial transcript, yes. With regards to everything else, no. And part of the reason for that is, as Mr. Alonso alluded to — it is unclear what the claims are as against Mr. Brewster.

(Audio feedback)

THE COURT: We can't shut the system down because the listen only mode would be disconnected. We are calling the IT

L7n2ShaA kjc 1 people. 2 (Pause) THE COURT: I'm going to step off the bench and 3 4 anyone who wants to leave the courtroom, stay outside. I don't 5 want people to be subjected to this noise. We will have IT 6 come up. 7 THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. (Recess) 8 9 THE COURT: The problem seems to be taken care of. 10 You may be seated. 11 Mr. Poscablo, you may continue. 12 MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, your Honor. 13 Judge, I was thinking, is there a particular area you 14 would like me to start with or a particular area you would like 15 me to address? THE COURT: Why don't you start with the bill of 16 17 particulars. MR. POSCABLO: Okay. That makes sense, your Honor. 18 I don't want to belabor the points that have been 19 20 made, because I think Mr. Alonso's argument was precise. Even 21 though we are talking about two different charging instruments 22 here, the same principle applies. And what I had said to the 23 Court before is that millions of pages of documents have been

produced, and I think one of the points Mr. Alonso pointed out

is, even within one document, that document can have a

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thousand pages that needs to be reviewed, and the problem that we are facing, even though, you know, we do have access to this Casepoint database, is they are not searchable and the handwritten notes, the photographs, you can't just rely on the searches, so you have to do a document-by-document review.

One of the things that Mr. Sobelman said struck me, when he said that this isn't about a transaction, this isn't a specific transaction case, but it is, Judge. It is about a hundred transactions, according to the government. There are about a hundred transactions with a hundred victims.

THE COURT: Ms. Blakely, have somebody come up here and stay here.

(Pause)

THE COURT: The system is off. Speak loudly.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, this is, in fact, about a hundred victims. It is about a hundred different contracts with a hundred different individuals who purchased services, and as a result I think what's going on here is the government, who has been investigating this case for over five years, they know exactly or at least they say that they know exactly what this case is about, but they don't want to tell us what it is. They don't want to identify for us, you know, well, which transactions are you talking about? Which sales floors are you talking about? Because they want to preserve their ability to charge

a lot of different things and prove a lot of different things at trial. And that makes it impossible to mount the defense.

If I have to argue why Joey Minetto's client that my client didn't service, doesn't have a contract with, and didn't in 2012 --

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt, but we are told by individuals on the audio line that now they cannot hear. If your Honor would like to proceed, we would have no objection, but -- oh, I'm sorry, but Mr. Brewster is on the line.

THE COURT: All right. Let's get the IT people here. Just stay in place.

(Pause)

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, we are told it may be back on.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: It should be on. I have 11 people showing.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's proceed. Let's do two tracks. Let's proceed, and let's have somebody from IT come up.

MR. POSCABLO: I will try not to yell, then, Judge.

You know, the United States Supreme Court in *Dennis v*.

United States said that in a conspiracy case, particularly one that was charged as broadly as this one, spanning a long time, across multiple jurisdictions, and involving a lot of people,

THE COURT: Let's wait.

(Pause)

THE COURT: I am going to step off. When the person comes up, Ms. Blakely, I want him to remain here for the rest of the argument.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Okay.

(Recess)

THE COURT: All right. Proceed.

MR. POSCABLO: All right, Judge. Third time's the charm. Fingers crossed.

Your Honor, we were talking about the bill of particulars before we had to take a break. I said to the Court, we make this motion because, in a conspiracy case, such as this one, particularly one that is charged as broadly as this one, over the course of many years, multiple jurisdictions, and involving a lot of named and unnamed people, it poses a significant risk of wrongful attribution of responsibility to one or more of the multiple defendants, and that's the Supreme Court's statement in Dennis v. United States.

And that's one of the main reasons why we ask for a bill of particulars in this case. Because, as Mr. Alonso

pointed out, this is a multiyear conspiracy. I think that the one they charged for Mr. Brewster is a seven-year conspiracy involving ten defendants that the government stated is the same exact conspiracy as the one charged in *Ketabchi*, which I agree with along with Mr. Alonso.

Now, in response to my motion, the government argued that they provided extensive detail through their discovery, the mountains of documents that they produced, including affidavits, and they pointed to the trial transcript.

THE COURT: Just a moment.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Apparently the listen-only mode people were disconnected, so we are going to try to establish, reestablish that. Just wait to see if we can do it. It is unfortunate, but we are doing what we can. There is no -- this is legal argument, this whole hearing is legal argument, so there is no actual right of a defendant to be present of course.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Of course I do want every defendant who wants to be here to be able to be here, either listening in or physically present, but we are going to proceed regardless.

I think we have reestablished that listen-only mode call. Go ahead, sir.

MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, your Honor. Before the

technical difficulties, we were speaking with the Court about the bill of particulars motion that Mr. Brewster filed, and I echo in many of the argument -- I echo many --

THE COURT: What is it that you want in the bill of particulars? I'm going to ask Mr. Alonso the same thing, because Mr. Alonso, I think, was a little hard to follow exactly what areas he wanted.

What are the areas that you want, and I also -- well, go ahead. Let's start with that.

MR. POSCABLO: Well, Judge, I actually, you know, reviewed Mr. Alonso's brief on behalf of his client, Ms. Shah, and I think that the way that he outlined it is exactly right.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Alonso, what are the now current areas that you want? You were talking about how you wanted a particular area. Go ahead, Mr. Alonso.

MR. ALONSO: They are --

THE COURT: One, two, three.

MR. ALONSO: One, purchasers, victims; two, conspirators; three, the precise business services that they are talking about; four, sales floors --

THE COURT: Just a moment. Yeah.

MR. ALONSO: -- and, five, money laundering activities under Count Two. Count Two is a similarly broad eight-year conspiracy.

THE COURT: When you say money laundering activities,

what are you asking for?

MR. ALONSO: I'm asking for whatever it is they mean by money laundering activities. The Count Two is similarly vague, as Count One, so it talks about --

THE COURT: All right. Victims, conspirators, business services, sales floors, money laundering activities. Thank you.

Mr. Poscablo.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, can I just add to that, because I think Mr. Alonso's initially had two more, which is, the fulfillment companies, and when he said business services, he also, I think, in his brief wrote coaching, coaching services; and, lastly, time frame, your Honor.

THE COURT: The time frame in the indictment.

MR. POSCABLO: Well, Judge, that may be correct that they charge a seven-year time frame, but if you look at the specific affidavits in particular -- we will go over one today, the one affidavit that relies on Ryan Hult -- we are talking about a six-month period of time from 2018 to 2019. What I am trying to understand from the government is are they saying that Mr. Brewster -- when did Mr. Brewster purportedly enter this conspiracy? It's not clear from the indictment, and so I would like to know that.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MR. POSCABLO: That is really it for the bill of

particulars, your Honor.

If there are other things that you want to ask --

THE COURT: Let me ask the government, with those items in mind, government, those seven items in mind, how has your production been organized in a way that that information can or cannot be obtained by the defense?

MR. SOBELMAN: I'm happy to go through them individually, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: With respect to victims, our production has sales records, e-mails with particular victims, communications with particular victims.

THE COURT: How do they know who the victims are? To what extent can they determine from your production who the victims are?

MR. SOBELMAN: Those are the victims, your Honor.

THE COURT: Who are?

MR. SOBELMAN: The people --

THE COURT: Who are the victims?

MR. SOBELMAN: The people to whom sales were made. I mean, that is the universe of victims that we are talking about. There was no victim that we are going to put forth at trial for whom we do not have some type of record --

THE COURT: Is that hundreds of people? Thousands of people? It's hundreds of people.

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1 MR. SOBELMAN: Probably thousands, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. How are they to make sense of that? 3 4 MR. SOBELMAN: The same way that defendants make sense 5 of it in any large-scale fraud case. There are no cases, your 6 Honor, with thousands of victims where the Court has ordered 7 that we enumerate each one. It's not practical. 8 conspiracy case, where we are seeking to prove an agreement. 9 THE COURT: How do the defendants -- I take it you are 10 not producing, or are you, producing files to them under the 11 category of victims? 12 MR. SOBELMAN: May I just talk to Ms. Fletcher for a 13 moment? 14 THE COURT: Yes, of course. 15 MR. POSCABLO: They have not, Judge. 16 (Counsel confer) 17 MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, there are a few categories of documents that --18 19 THE COURT: Talk to Ms. Fletcher or anyone you need 20 to. My questions are, how is your production organized such 21 that this information, each of those seven categories, can be 22 obtained by the defense? So talk to her. Ms. Fletcher, you 23 certainly can speak, if you are the expert on this. It makes 24 no difference to me.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, I just want to make one

point, which I am happy to circle back to more substantively, which is, under the law, the defendants are not entitled to any of these things. So to the extent your Honor is considering ordering us to give them some of these things, I just want the opportunity to go back and point you to some cases that show that they are not entitled to them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SOBELMAN: I understand your Honor asking a practical question, and I am happy to answer it.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SOBELMAN: Our --

THE COURT: That can perhaps obviate the case analysis --

MR. SOBELMAN: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- but in the interest of having this October date actually go forward and getting them the information. Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor, and we have no interest in hiding the ball and every interest in helping the defense identify relevant items.

THE COURT: The government is here to help them and they are here to help you. I understand. Proceed.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor.

Production is generally organized by source. So there are victim names, identifiers, documents in a variety of

different places. One is the internal business records of the various sales floors that have communications with them, that have lead lists or sales lists, that have victims names and identifying information, and the sales data associated with those individuals. We have --

THE COURT: It's your position that everything that every sales floor -- every person that every sales floor entered into a contract with is part of this conspiracy?

MR. SOBELMAN: No, your Honor. It potentially could be. We have not interviewed every person listed in the documents. We have interviewed a lot of people, but we have not and will not interview every single person. It is the same as any other, you know, large-scale conspiracy. Our goal and what we intend to prove at trial is that these people agreed to commit this crime, and we will show that there were many acts taken in furtherance of that crime, but our view, as I said earlier, this is sort of a Tuzman "all or most" case, not a "handful of discrete acts" case. But we don't know, we don't have documents from or interviews with every single potential victim, same as in the Ketabchi case.

But in terms of the defense being able to identify victims, we have the internal business records, sales records, lead lists from the sales floors and fulfillment floors and the coaching floors. There are documents the victims provide us which we --

THE COURT: And how are those, again, produced to the defense?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SOBELMAN: In a few different ways. It depends where they come from.

So, for example, if they are from a Google share drive that we obtained, they are within the Google share drive, and we say Google share drive from X account.

If it's from the computer sales floor, they are produced, when we -- if they request the contents of that computer.

If it's from an e-mail search warrant that we did, it is in the set of materials that's in that account.

We have not gone through, for our own purposes or for the defense, and pulled out every document that lists a victim on it. There are — it is voluminous. But in order to — for us to try the case or for them to try the case, no one needs to identify every single of the thousands of people that were marketed to in the course of the scheme. It's just not going to be part of the case. If that's something they want to do and they want more time to do it, again, we have no objection if they want more time to review discovery materials which are substantial in this case, but this is not — it's not like we have a comprehensive list that we are sitting on and we could just hand over pursuant to a Court order. It would be —

MR. POSCABLO: But they do have that, your Honor. they

do have that. They know which victims that they want to put on trial.

THE COURT: No, but you are not entitled to your witness list now.

MR. POSCABLO: Understood. But what they are saying --

THE COURT: You will get it, but you are not entitled to it.

MR. POSCABLO: That's right.

MR. SOBELMAN: And, your Honor, the --

MR. POSCABLO: But what they are saying --

THE COURT: Let me hear Mr. Poscablo.

MR. POSCABLO: What they are saying is there are thousands of victims on hundreds of pages of discovery, and every single one of them is a victim in this case.

THE COURT: I have to do this in an orderly fashion. Let Mr. Sobelman respond to those seven items.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, just on this first item and then I can move on, one thing that's interesting about the defense argument here is, the documents I am talking about are their documents. So the defense is almost certainly in a better position to know how their own clients and their coconspirators saved and categorized these items. So the most compelling documents for Mr. Brewster's counsel are going to be the documents that were on Mr. Brewster's computer, in his

e-mail, on the computers --

THE COURT: But it is a conspiracy case, sir.

MR. SOBELMAN: Agreed, your Honor. I'm just saying the victims that we would call for a Brewster trial are going to be victims of Brewster's floor. So the -- it's not that they have to identify and look at every single victim of the overall conspiracy. There is a way for them to be targeted about their review and identification of the materials and to the extent they want to do their own investigation, it is not boundless.

THE COURT: Conspirators.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: 41 names. List. Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes. We gave Ms. Shah a list of 41 names and entities, both individuals and entities that were involved in the scheme. As far as we are concerned, the coconspirator request is just something trying to bind us. They have the notice that they are entitled to. If Mr. Brewster wants a similar --

THE COURT: What is the 41 -- the 41 names are those who you claim are her coconspirators, correct?

MR. SOBELMAN: It's individuals and entities that were involved, that were in sort of her orbit of her involvement in the scheme. So we don't want to bind ourself, because our investigation is ongoing and we are still beginning our

preparations for trial, but the coconspirators who would be relevant to her trial, we believe, are on that list.

THE COURT: Business services and coaching services, in other words, that's Mr. Alonso's list --

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- taken from the *Ketabchi* summation, which were essentially the services that were offered by the sales floors in that conspiracy.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor. Just on the coconspirator point, we have not given a similar list to Mr. Brewster. He never — really didn't ask for one. If he wants us to do something similar, because we haven't had the kind of dialogue with him that we had with Ms. Shah's counsel, we are happy to have that same dialogue with him and —

THE COURT: Have the dialogue with anyone who wants a dialogue. Remember, you are the government and you are here to help them. You just told me that.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor, but we can't answer questions that are not asked of us.

THE COURT: No, I understand that. Proceed.

MR. SOBELMAN: With respect to the business services, they have notice. It's in the indictment. It's in the search warrants. We give --

THE COURT: It's not in the indictment, the specific services.

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1 MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor. A number of them are 2 We quote that portion of the indictment in our named. 3 opposition. 4 (Pause) 5 THE COURT: I'm reading the original indictment, sir. 6 Show me. 7 MR. POSCABLO: It's not in the indictment, Judge. THE COURT: Let him finish. 8 9 MR. POSCABLO: Sorry. 10 THE COURT: I will give you a full opportunity, sir. 11 MR. POSCABLO: I'm sorry, your Honor. 12 MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, I was looking at the 13 superseding indictment, although they sort of are --14 essentially they are the same. 15 THE COURT: Which one are you looking at? MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor, on page -- I believe 16 17 it is 3 of the indictment. It lists examples of business 18 services as coaching sessions, tax preparation, or website 19 design services, and electronic or paper pamphlets. 20 THE COURT: Just a moment. I'm trying to find it. 21 MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor. Take your time, 22 please. 23

THE COURT: What indictment are you on?

MR. SOBELMAN: This is the S4 indictment, at page --

THE COURT: S4 indictment, page 3.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Paragraph? I see it, paragraph 4. Tax preparation or website design services.

All right. Proceed. Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: There are also other lists of similar services in our search warrant affidavits that provide adequate notice, and we pointed to the *Ketabchi* trial record, which defense counsel quoted from. All of those are also applicable. That's why we keep pointing to that record. The only one that would not come up in this trial would be Youngevity. But the rest of those are all part of the same scheme, which is why we keep --

THE COURT: Have you told them that? Did you tell them that? You are the government.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes. It's in our motion -- it's in our opposition to Ms. Shah's brief, on page 30, where we said they have notice of this because it's in these three places.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MR. SOBELMAN: With respect to the sales floors, I understand that is only -- again, that's part of the list we gave Ms. Shah's counsel for her. We are happy to give a similar list to Mr. Brewster.

THE COURT: Are there hundreds of sales floors?

MR. SOBELMAN: No, there are not. There certainly won't be hundreds mentioned at trial. It will be ten to 20.

And we are, again, happy to talk to counsel and give them a list of sales floors that --

THE COURT: Do that.

MR. SOBELMAN: -- are in that ten to 20.

THE COURT: Do that.

MR. SOBELMAN: We did for Ms. Shah, and we are happy to do that for Mr. Brewster.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SOBELMAN: The sort of money laundering activities ask, the transactions at -- you know, first of all, it's a conspiracy, not any particular transaction, which is important. Obviously if this were a case with a particular transaction, we would identify that transaction. It is a conspiracy. And the transactions that we would likely or potentially put evidence on at trial are all within the financial records that we have produced, although some of the evidence of that conspiracy, maybe the majority of it, would likely be through cooperator testimony that we have no obligation to disclose at this time.

THE COURT: Well, fulfillment company.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yeah, and same thing for Brewster. The money laundering evidence is in his own bank records. So it's not as if there is something else that we are hiding the ball on. These are transactions that he engaged in.

THE COURT: Fulfillment companies.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: This is Mr. Brewster.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes. Ms. Shah withdrew her request for that because she realized they are in the list that we gave her. We are happy to do the same for Mr. Brewster and give him a list of companies that we think will be relevant to his trial.

THE COURT: Well, why haven't you had these discussions beforehand? Do that.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, he hasn't asked.

THE COURT: If they haven't asked for them, you are under no obligation to volunteer. I understand that.

Time frame.

MR. SOBELMAN: Time frame, your Honor was entirely correct, which is, the time frame is listed in the indictment, and there is, not to turn to a legal issue, but a ton of case law on this that we have no obligation to specify precisely when a defendant joined the conspiracy. It's, frankly, not even relevant to the trial. We have to show that at some point they were a member of the conspiracy. We don't have to prove and the jury will be instructed we don't have to prove that he was a member at any particular point in time other than the date range provided.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Poscablo, that narrowed some of the --

MR. SOBELMAN: I just want to add one thing. That being said, we are happy to talk to Mr. Poscablo and, like we did in our opposition for Ms. Shah's brief, give him sort of a sketch of where we understand he was — what he was doing at various points in time during the conspiracy.

THE COURT: Do it.

MR. SOBELMAN: We are happy to.

THE COURT: All right. Do it.

Mr. Poscablo, back to you, sir.

MR. POSCABLO: I'm sorry for interrupting earlier, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. POSCABLO: So --

THE COURT: This has helped now definitely. You will get a list of fulfillment companies. You will get a list of sales floors.

Go ahead.

MR. POSCABLO: And I agree with that all of that.

THE COURT: You have got the coconspirators.

MR. POSCABLO: The issue I still have is with the victims. And if I may explain to the Court how I believe they have produced it, they have produced — there will be a document or a series of documents, a thousand pages in Casepoint, and it will list in the discovery letter "Citigroup bank records." We have got to go through every single one of

them to see, okay, well, that is not my client's. Oh, I think that's, you know, Ketabchi's. That's a name I don't understand. Sometimes it is redacted. Sometimes the number is redacted. I can posit that it's a victim, but I don't know that. And if what they are saying is every person in this conspiracy was a victim, then it would take us years to identify them, interview them, and prepare for a trial if we don't understand -- if we don't narrow the scope of who these victims are.

THE COURT: You are going to get the list of witnesses. You are going to get that. You are going to get the government exhibits. You are going to get the 3500 material. You are going to get the *Giglio* material.

MR. POSCABLO: Then I guess we will just have to wait for that, but that's really what the issue is here, Judge.

THE COURT: And I want parties to be discussing a time frame, because if you can't agree upon a time frame -- and normally parties can for pretrial disclosures -- then I want to do it, and I want to do it rather expeditiously.

Next.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, I know we are going to talk about this later, I think, after this, but I am concerned about the date of this trial and the reason is, you know, they produced --

THE COURT: Let's go through your motion, then we will

talk about the date, and then I will let everybody have lunch. Go ahead.

MR. POSCABLO: What would you like for me to turn to next, your Honor? Perhaps we can talk about the motion to suppress evidence.

THE COURT: Absolutely. That's how you did it in your brief. Go ahead.

MR. POSCABLO: Your Honor, the affidavit of Special Agent Jesse Imbergamo of Homeland Security Investigations contains false statements and admissions that undermine the validity of the warrant.

THE COURT: No, but they are so minor, as I see it, from what you have. It is the same -- in a way, the same as Mr. Alonso, the word "operations," the word that you -- Money Sucking Website was nefarious. There is nothing material here. It omitted the fact that an injunction was entered against one of the cooperating witnesses. Adjectives are inflammatory. That's not the heart of the search warrant. The search warrant seems to have accurate material, at least insofar as it was known. The government in that -- it goes both to the West Fourth search and East Tropicana search, at least as I see it, sir.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, the criminal cause as against Mr. Brewster is captured in one paragraph, paragraph 9, with five subparagraphs. And all of them rely on Ryan Hult, who is

identified in the search warrant as CW3.

Now, we know who Ryan Hult is. Your Honor is very familiar with Ryan Hult. He is the failed cooperator who lied to you, lied to the government, lied to his defense counsel, and committed crimes while he was a cooperating witness, and did not get a 5K from the government as a result.

THE COURT: And what are you asking me to draw from that?

MR. POSCABLO: I'm asking to you draw from that that the information that he provided, which the agent relied on in affecting this warrant, is false. He said Brewster and McMurtrey operated a website. They just know it's not true. That is just not true. They know it's not true. And the way we know that is because, in subsequent situations, they have said that it's not actually operating.

You can look at the indictment, your Honor. And let me point your Honor to the indictment in this case. This is what they wrote about that. "Brewster, for example" -- and I am quoting from page 3, paragraph 3 of the indictment. This is the first indictment in this case. "Brewster, for example, provided lead lists generated through a website referred to by Brewster and other coconspirators as the Money Sucking Website."

That is wholly different, wholly different, than what they say in order to convince this magistrate judge to grant

this warrant. They say he operated it. I'm not quibbling with language here, but they didn't say that in the indictment because they knew it wasn't true. But in the search warrant they did. They made it seem like he was — he owned it, but in the indictment they didn't. In the indictment they said he sold lead lists from it. That's what they know to be true.

And if you look at paragraph C, I mean, that's really all we are talking about. Paragraph E, where we are saying that he operated Money Sucking Website. If you throw that out, what do you really have here? Well, you have the consensual recording, which I will — you know, happy to discuss, but then you have paragraph E that says he stopped talking to the cooperator because he heard people were getting arrested. Judge, he stopped talking to the cooperator because he didn't want to do business with him because the cooperator kept trying to induce him to say things and do things and he is like, I have no reason to talk to you anymore.

And then in paragraph E, they say that they talked to several victims of Brewster's telemarketing floor, each of whom was convinced to invest in purported business services based on a salesperson's false representation, a salesperson's false representation. To Mr. Alonso's point, it doesn't even say that Mr. Brewster made that representation. It says someone on his — it doesn't — it says in fact someone else did it. How is that tied to Mr. Brewster?

And to that point, Judge, Mr. Alonso made a great point earlier when he was talking about the language in the indictment for Ms. Shah, and that was insufficient because it said, if you remember, "at no point did the defendant intend that the victims would actually earn any of the promised return." They don't even say that in the indictment against Mr. Brewster. All it says is, "But at no point did the victims actually earn." They didn't even say the word "intent" because they can't, because they didn't. And it's clear from this search warrant that Mr. Brewster is not alleged to have said anything or made any false representations to any victims.

So if you take away everything that Mr. Hult said, you are left with a very generic explanation of what the scheme is. And I offer to your Honor that that is insufficient to establish probable cause, and I think a *Franks* hearing is appropriate here.

THE COURT: All right. I will want Mr. Sobelman -- you might as well do it now, sir.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor.

Defense does not come close to establishing the type of showing that would be required for a Franks hearing. "A defendant must make a substantial ordinary showing that a deliberate falsehood or statement made with reckless disregard for the truth was included in the warrant affidavit and the statement was necessary to the judge's finding of probable

cause."

THE COURT: But what Mr. Poscablo --

MR. POSCABLO: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- wants you to do, wants me to do, is throw out the reliance on Hult and look at what you are left with.

MR. SOBELMAN: And there is literally no legal basis to do that. The information reported from Hult was accurately reported by the agent, and that is the only analysis is that the agent accurately reported the information from a third party. You don't then say, okay, well, maybe the third party was wrong or the third party was lying.

Even if Hult had lied to the agent, which he did not do -- and Mr. Poscablo is wrong when he suggested that Hult lied to us or to the Court. He did violate his cooperation agreement, as your Honor knows, by committing other crimes, after this search warrant was sworn out, at least to the government's knowledge at that time. He did violate his cooperation agreement. He is a failed cooperator.

THE COURT: You are talking about the good faith of the agent in reporting what Mr. Hult told him. At that time he had no reason then to think that any of this was inaccurate.

Is that your point?

MR. SOBELMAN: That's correct, your Honor, although it's not a good-faith exception case, although the good-faith

exception would also apply, although the types of allegations here don't make it directly applicable. But the point is, the case law is very clear that if third-party statements are being reported in an affidavit, you look at the knowledge of the person reporting those statements, not the underlying statements themselves. So there is no basis to throw out Hult's statements at all.

The things that might have impeached his credibility either were not known to the government at the time, such as his narcotics conduct, or are, as the Court already suggested, immaterial like, the fact he might have violated an FTC order. We disclosed in the affidavit that he had pled guilty to multiple fraud crimes and was providing assistance in the hopes of obtaining leniency at sentencing. That was more than enough.

If your Honor looks at the *Cook* case which is SDNY 2004, and cited in our brief, "Information accurately reported by an affiant cannot be challenged for the alleged inaccuracy of the information provided by the third party," and that's what the defendant is trying to do here, is reach through --

THE COURT: All right. I understand that point. Anything else?

MR. SOBELMAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POSCABLO: But, Judge, in response to that, look

at what paragraph 9 says. It doesn't say that Special Agent Imbergamo spoke to CW3. It says that "Special Agent Imbergamo had conversations with other law enforcement agents and reviewed law enforcement reports and learned the following."

Then they learned — then she lays out what Ryan Hult falsely told the government and they relied on it. And here is my argument to that.

They knew that paragraph B, which says that

Mr. Brewster owned and operated Money Sucking Website and then
paragraph C, where they cite a consensual recording that they
say Mr. Brewster says, even in that conversation, that recorded
conversation, your Honor, which we transcribed for the Court in
our declaration, Ryan Hult is talking about another person. He
is talking about the actual owner of Money Sucking Website.

And so my point is that they want to say that Ryan Hult lied to
them and told them, oh, Money Sucking Website was owned by
Cameron Brewster and that's how they got probable cause, but
now they want to say, well, we didn't know that he was lying,
but they did.

THE COURT: I understand the point. Let's go on.

MR. POSCABLO: I think I can move on --

THE COURT: Suppression of the Hult calls.

MR. POSCABLO: Yes, your Honor. I don't need to go into an explanation of who Ryan Hult is, but I will tell this to the Court. It appears that -- I listened to all those

calls, and I think -- and, again, the government produced, I think, over 40 hours worth of calls. I mean, last night the government produced a chart, it is four pages long, of all the calls Mr. Hult made and recorded in this case. I can represent to the Court that the calls I listened to for Mr. Brewster didn't have a preamble, "this is special agent so-and-so, this is July 1, 2021."

THE COURT: So?

MR. POSCABLO: So the point is that Mr. Hult was running rampant making these calls. There is no indicia of reliability as to when the calls were made. What was he recording? When was he recording them?

THE COURT: Where do you find the obligation for the government to turn that over? You can attack the calls if you think they are not reliable. Where in the law is there an obligation for them to tell you that?

MR. POSCABLO: I can, and you are right, Judge. Here is my argument. My argument is this: The government says that he made all these calls under the color of law enforcement authority. Okay? But there is no --

THE COURT: Battle it out at trial.

MR. POSCABLO: There is no indication of that here.

THE COURT: Battle it out at trial. That's a good argument. Make it to a jury.

MR. POSCABLO: They produced no discovery about it.

THE COURT: I don't think that changes my comment.

MR. POSCABLO: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Move on.

MR. POSCABLO: Judge, like Mr. Alonso said, I'm not asking --

THE COURT: Your next one is Brady, Giglio, and Jencks.

MR. POSCABLO: Oh, right. I'm sorry. On the *Brady* matter, I think Ms. Blakely was looking into whether an order has been issued.

THE COURT: It has not, and we are going to get one out.

MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, your Honor. We ask that it be the same order that was issued for Ms. Shah.

THE COURT: I'm obviously going to look at it, but I don't think promptly means immediately.

MR. POSCABLO: Yes, your Honor.

I do have a *Brady* issue to raise, and I raised it with the government many, many months ago, and it is this. It is that I have come to learn that Detective Bastos, in his calls and outreach to witnesses, left messages saying: You are a victim of a fraud, please give me a call. We will battle that out at trial and the bias they have added, and I don't know whether — they didn't call Bastos in the last trial. They might call him here. But I think that's problematic.

But here is the point: This particular purchaser called Detective Bostos back and said, hey, I don't know what you are talking about. I am perfectly fine and happy. I asked the government to search for any reports or indication that that — that there was something like that, that there was a report like that. They told me no.

THE COURT: That there was a report.

MR. POSCABLO: Yeah, so, you know, if a detective calls a witness or a potential victim and they --

THE COURT: Here is what you are saying, if I understand.

MR. POSCABLO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: The detective calls individual A, says you have been a victim of a fraud. You are asking for some substantiation of that statement.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ POSCABLO: Correct, your Honor. Correct. And I was told that there was none.

Now, that -- in my mind, that is problematic. Because what that means, and I think what that might mean is that reports weren't written if a victim didn't respond or a victim responded negatively. And so that is the request for the government, is that, similar to Mr. Alonso's request, they may not have a writing about it, but they need to probe their agents to see if certain conversations like that took place.

And if so, then that 100 number it's really relative, because

if they called, you know, 200 people and a hundred people said, hey, I wasn't victimized, well, that's a different number altogether than 100 percent of the people were victims.

So I asked the government to produce that and look into that, and I just wanted to alert the Court to that.

THE COURT: That's fine. That's something for discussion between the parties.

MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Sobelman, did you want to saying something now?

MR. SOBELMAN: Briefly, your Honor.

This is one of the things we have talked to Mr. Poscablo about I think very shortly after he filed this motion or maybe even before he filed the motion. We probed our files. We have spoken with the agents. We don't know what interaction that might have been. To the extent Mr. Poscablo can give us — we have asked and he declined — any more information about when or the person's name, it might be that there is something there that we are not aware of and can't find, but without more information, we have done the search we can do.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Poscablo.

MR. POSCABLO: Your Honor, as to the Jencks material, and I think the parties will hash this out, but I will say that

if it is the 55,000 pages of Jencks material that they produced to us related to the *Ketabchi* case, we are going to need more than two weeks -- 5500, I'm sorry, 5500, it's going to be -- we are going to require more than two weeks, as the government stated earlier, to review that.

THE COURT: Don't tell me that now. If the parties are going to discuss that, if they can't reach an expeditious conclusion, I will decide.

MR. POSCABLO: Yes, your Honor.

And to end, I made a similar request that the Court review *in camera* the grand jury testimony that had to do with Mr. Hult because my — based on what I am seeing here is that the government's initial case relied almost entirely on Mr. Hult as against Mr. Brewster, and all I am asking is that the Court review *in camera* the testimony that was given that relied on Mr. Hult's information.

THE COURT: All right. I understand. I will look at all of this.

I was going to render decisions today. I don't feel I am -- I should. There are some things I need to think about, some of the case law that's been cited. So I'm not going to render decisions today.

On the 6(e), I just don't see it. The protections of 6(e) are so important, there is nothing that rises to the particular need here, I can tell you, on grand jury. I think

that's it. Correct?

MR. POSCABLO: I think that's it, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me tell you, I have said now, I am not going to render decisions. I can to the extent I am denying the request for the *in camera* review or production of the grand jury materials. The allegations simply don't rise to the standard of my reaching 6(e) here and having either *in camera* — not really reach if I do it *in camera*, but there is no need for me to do it *in camera*.

Mr. Alonso, you withdraw your request for the *Franks* hearing, correct?

MR. ALONSO: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think I have a sense of the production -- of how these documents were produced. I want the parties to continue to talk about the bill of particulars issue. I think I have made some headway here. Talk to each other. Each of the parties here, Brewster and Shah, have said they want to file additional motions if need be. I don't have to rule on that. If something arises where a motion is necessary, make your motion.

I think that's as far as I can take it today. I certainly intend to get you a decision on the outstanding things as soon as I can.

Anything else, government?

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, very quick issue I just

want to flag --

THE COURT: Oh, we want to talk about timing of the trial.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Of course. I heard things wafting by that I didn't like hearing. The defense, both Brewster and Shah, say they are prepared to go to trial. The government is always prepared to go to trial. I'm not going to try this case in multiple tranches. I am going to try it once. We have an October date. What is the issue, sir? I can sense it is out there. What is it?

MR. SOBELMAN: So the issue the government wants to raise is that our understanding is that the current structure for trials only permits two defendants at a time and there is actually a third defendant, Chad Allen, who we think is also going to go to trial, and so we just wanted guidance from the Court.

THE COURT: You are talking COVID? Is that what you are talking.

MR. SOBELMAN: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: The structure.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: You are talking about -- we don't know what the state of COVID is going to be in October. I will do -- we will see what it is. I will do whatever I can to

make sure that we have COVID compliant courtrooms. If it requires taking out some of the spectator seats and instead having another defense table in what now is on the other side of the bar, we will do that. Maybe we can commandeer some witness rooms for counsel to be able to spread out. I will do what I can. Everything will be COVID compliant. I can assure the parties that. If your issue is COVID compliance, leave it in the hands of the COVID subcommittee of the Board of Judges and my gentle ministrations in getting a COVID compliant courtroom.

MR. SOBELMAN: Happy to do that, your Honor. I was just flagging because our current understand is there a two-defendant limit for any trials.

THE COURT: There is.

MR. SOBELMAN: So to the extent that continues and your Honor is not able to navigate around it, we would just be grateful if — maybe today is not the time, but at whatever point, we would be grateful for guidance on how you want the parties to discuss, assuming you do, which defendant or defendants would go first. But it sounds like it might be premature.

THE COURT: A, premature; B, I'm not having two trials here.

MR. SOBELMAN: That's why we were flagging it.

THE COURT: All right.

1 MR. SOBELMAN: Thank you. 2 THE COURT: To the extent --3 MR. POSCABLO: Judge, may I? 4 THE COURT: To the extent I can, I will take care of 5 it. To the extent I can't, we may have an adjournment of the 6 trial. We don't know what the COVID situation is going to be. 7 It changes every day. Today it doesn't look so good, I must say, from the rise of this new variant. 8 9 MR. POSCABLO: Your Honor --10 THE COURT: But I will do everything I can just to have this tried on the date set. 11 12 MR. SOBELMAN: Just one more data point. In the event 13 that there are two trials -- and just something for the Court 14 to consider -- we do think there is actually a good way to 15 split it. There is much more overlap in our case, as we can currently conceive it, between Brewster and Shah than there is 16 17 with Allen. 18 But, again, it sounds like it is premature. I just wanted to flag for your Honor that --19 20 THE COURT: You have. 21 MR. SOBELMAN: -- we thought about it. 22 THE COURT: Thank you. 23 MR. POSCABLO: Judge, I beg your indulgence. I 24 represent an individual in the Southern District of Illinois, 25 and that Court has set a firm trial date, it appears, for

October 18. I was waiting to see if we were actually going to move forward on the 24th before I asked that Court to adjourn that trial, and I didn't want to do that, because I was worried that what would happen is, I would move that to January, and then your Honor would want to move this one to January because of COVID protocols because of everything else.

THE COURT: Welcome to real life.

MR. POSCABLO: So I guess what I am asking --

THE COURT: All I can tell you is what I have told you. Go ahead, sir.

MR. POSCABLO: I guess what I am asking, your

Honor -- and I can make this in a letter to explain to the

Court -- on behalf of Mr. Brewster, we are asking to adjourn

the trial date to a date in the first quarter, which I think

will provide more certainty for the Court to try all three

defendants.

THE COURT: You are asking that now?

MR. POSCABLO: I am. I was trying to assess what the situation was. I spoke to the government about it, I spoke with defense counsel about it, and I think it is — the defendants would like to do it all together as well. And given the uncertainty you have whether we are actually going to move forward on October 24 I am just asking for the Court to consider it. That way I know that I will have certainty in October with the other case, and I won't ask for an adjournment

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1 of that case. 2 What's the position of the parties? THE COURT: MR. ALONSO: We would like to go forward on October 3 18, your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: It's not October 18, is it? MR. SOBELMAN: Yes. 6 7 MR. ALONSO: October 18. MR. POSCABLO: 24. I keep messing up those other 8 October 24 is the other date. 9 dates. 10 THE COURT: What is the position of the government? 11 MR. SOBELMAN: Sorry, your Honor, one moment. 12 (Counsel confer) 13 THE COURT: Do you have an incarcerated defendant in 14 the other case? 15 MR. POSCABLO: No, your Honor. THE COURT: How old is that case? 16 17 MR. POSCABLO: Less than six months, Judge. 18 THE COURT: Make the request for the adjournment 19 We are going forward. Let me hear what the government there. 20 says. 21 MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, we don't have an objection 22 to the request. 23 I do note that if we had -- I understand defendant 24 Shah wants to go forward and the Court will consider that.

But if Shah also were moved to the first quarter, we could go

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ahead on Mr. Allen in October and have the other two defendants in the first quarter of next year, and that would solve the --

THE COURT: It doesn't solve my issue of --

MR. SOBELMAN: Of not having two trials.

THE COURT: Exactly.

MR. SOBELMAN: Understood.

THE COURT: Make the --

MR. POSCABLO: May I just say --

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, sorry, they are not duplicative. I'm not sure there would be any overlap in witnesses if that was the structure. Obviously your Honor is going to decide what the best formulation is.

THE COURT: There is no overlap? You mean Allen is, in essence, sui generis within a conspiracy case?

MR. SOBELMAN: No, your Honor, of course not, but in the overall structure of the conspiracy, with the dozens of people we have charged, Brewster and Shah are fairly close in that web. Allen is further away. And so there might be probably one -- we don't know exactly who our witnesses are, but probably one witness who would overlap between the two trials. And otherwise it's not like Brewster and Allen or Shah and Allen ran a floor together or anything like that. They are further away from each other in the conspiracy.

So if your Honor will permit, Ms. Fletcher can address

this better than I can.

MS. FLETCHER: Sorry, your Honor. I think we appreciate the Court's reluctance to have two trials. We also generally have that reluctance, but what we are trying to grapple with is the uncertainty around getting a trial date in October at all, the fact that the COVID protocol rules preclude us from having three defendants, and that we see, as a matter of efficiency, a potential opportunity to actually just split these defendants up and have what I think would be a relatively short trial of Chad Allen in October and a quarter 1 trial with defendant Brewster and defendant Shah. We sort of view those two trials as — the sum of them is no greater or smaller than the parts.

So there could be, for example, a week and a half long trial of Chad Allen in October, where we understand your Honor may have a number of other trials and could be slated between them, and a longer, two- to three-week trial of defendants Brewster and Shah in the first quarter of next year.

We understand Shah's position is that she would like to go forward. We understand Brewster's position is that he does not want to go forward. So we are having this conversation with the Court because we see a potential efficient way to solve this problem and ensure that all defendants are tried, to the extent they want to be, by the

end of Q1 2022, even if it means two trials. Because, as I said — I think AUSA Sobelman has alluded to this — we don't know all of our witnesses, but the witnesses that take the most time, as the Court knows, are cooperating witnesses, and I think, based on the landscape as I currently understand it, that there is only one cooperating witness who would testify at a trial of Chad Allen and also testify at a trial of Cameron Brewster and Jen Shah and I'm not even certain of that one. There are no overlapping victims. So it really is possible and perhaps more efficient to split the defendants in that way.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Let me speak to people who can give me a better sense of what it takes to reconfigure the courtrooms for COVID. As of now, we will go on the 18th with three defendants, but I need to think about it. If change my mind on that, I will let the parties know. I don't know when you need to make your request to the Illinois Court. Right now three defendants on the 18th. I guess I will talk to the District Executive's people, the people who did the buildout of the jury boxes. Oh, no, that wouldn't be different. It would be the courtroom that would have to be reconfigured.

All right. Let me think about it. Right now three defendants October 18. Thank you.

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L7n2ShaA kjc
               MR. POSCABLO: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: I appreciate everybody being here. It's
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      been a long morning and afternoon. Thank you.
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               COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.
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